An anthropogenesis of the philosophy of science ? A multidisciplinary project
The scientific method is conceived as a normative, immutable and universal model with internal criteria of legitimacy (facts, correspondence, consistency, demonstration) and external (Institutions, learned and professional societies). Indeed, the philosophy of science legitimizes the method of science as an autonomous, rational and axiologically neutral called by Feyerabend « law and order» : it supposes an approach delimited between theory and experience, theoretical research and practical application. The challenge in 1960s aims to challenge this methodological « paradigm » (Thomas Kuhn).
For Gaston Bachelard, Paul Feyerabend, the facts escape theory and therefore highlight question normative observations, correspondences, linear interpretations: it there is not a single method but different ways of constructing knowledge and that it is necessary to propose alternative theories. These different ways determine interpretative paradigms (Thomas Kuhn) ; For Paul Feyerabend there is no story canonical science and any philosophy of science should argue for an approach circular and non-linear which accepts the mismatch between facts and theories.
The approach criticism is inscribed in the questioning of the philosophy of science : « Give me the standard you like, I will show that it is violated at some important stages in the history of science, not through forgetfulness or neglect, but consciously and deliberately « . (Feyerabend)
Are there really different ways of building knowledge? This would induce that critical approaches in their plurality are legitimate and in particular the space of controversy which is at the heart of the construction of knowledge. If the method is abandoned what are the validation criteria to validate a plurality of methods? Because as Bourdieu indicates to be able to quit or enter a game you have to know the rules of the game.
Have these changed because of having proposed alternative theories? The internal standard at epistemology is not sufficient, we must also change the external criteria: at the risk of question the universality of criteria.
Questions Have the approaches of Feyerabend and Bachelard upset the old scientific methods? In internal terms Philosophers of science have debated on the evaluation of the relations between theory and experience, epistemology and laboratory. Yet the Is the distancing from common sense real or fictitious ? Has she not reinforced a neo-positivist ideology of scientificity ?
To upset the methods, it would be a question of starting from space and criteria internal to science and common to all approaches (normative or non-normative) in order to validate or invalidate the methods. Is that the case ? Doesn’t the criteria space as a referential framework induce a cultural filtering (Lazarsfeld) which exclusively determines normative methods because that legitimate ?
Questions Can we consider them as « open epistemologies » ? what would be closed epistemologies ? Would this imply in a first demarcation a line of demarcation between a non-normative and non-academic approach and a normative and academic approach? Where is the stake in a second délimitation it between two normative definitions of the philosophy of science ? Normality for Thomas Kuhn describes a state of institution of the sciences, should we not pose the subject of a normative philosophy of science ? How is the philosophy of science inscribed in the study of sciences (physical, biological, mathematical) while forgetting the sciences social ?
We are in a system of systematic interlocking or the identity of periods and concepts relate more to the desire for distinction rather than to the reality of ruptures or mutations.
An anthropogenesis supposes a non-delimitation between fields of research and a integrative conception of philosophies. This involves admitting the conditions for the possibility of framework for dialogue between several fields of philosophy, The relationship with philosophies language would also be an element of condition of possibility of a norm multidisciplinary.
Should not the philosophy of science be situated in an anthropogenesis of science, a multi-referential framework for the sciences (human, social, physical, biological, etc.) ?
With three dimensions,
A dogmatism that establishes an eternal space of legitimate knowledge inscribed in abstracto in the norms of a cosmology of the human and social sciences A historicist approach which institutes an explicit relativization which is often akin to a deconstruction of knowledge in so many epistemological questions ;
Finally, a dynamic reading: an anthropogenesis that aims to account for the complexity knowledge as a dynamic process on the one hand and as a social, political and symbolic on the other hand. This leads to pose as the main design the necessary complementarity of the human sciences (human sciences, social sciences, social sciences) with the so-called empirical sciences (mathematics, biology, physics Multidisciplinarity is an epistemological conception of the human and social sciences aiming to combine the knowledge of the different disciplines around a research object, themes and study spaces. The process that it supposes to have is a state of generality allowing to define different theoretical, practical and epistemological dimensions. For this to do the concept of anthropogenesis seems to me to be most operative. An anthropogenesis supposes no delimitation between fields of research and an integrative conception of philosophies. It is a question of admitting the conditions of possibility of a framework of dialogue between several fields of the human sciences in order to grasp the forms of crossing, the knowledge For example the relationship with the philosophies of language would also be a element of condition of possibility of a multidisciplinary standard.
The multidisciplinarity which is determined on a transversal regime should it not be situated in an anthropogenesis of sciences, a multi-referential framework of the sciences (human, social, physical, biological, etc.) ?
With three dimensions,
A dogmatism that establishes an eternal space of legitimate knowledge inscribed in abstracto in the norms of a cosmology of the human and social sciences A historicist approach which institutes an explicit relativization which is often akin to a deconstruction of knowledge in so many epistemological questions ;
Finally a dynamic reading: an anthropogenesis that aims to account for the complexity knowledge as a dynamic process on the one hand and as a social, political and symbolic on the other hand. This leads to pose as the main design the necessary complementarity of human sciences (human sciences, social sciences, social sciences) with so-called empirical sciences (mathematics, biology, physics) Introduction : what are the questions raised ?
The critical philosophy of science : Anthropogenesis allows us to offer stories imaginaries based on utopian (an ideal future) and dystopian (an ideal future) registers nightmarish). The multidisciplinary regime is a regime which, in the organization of knowledge in France is an idealized utopia. A utopia that we could propose in the register of a epistemological narration around a fiction : in this fiction the multidisciplinary regime would occupy the function of what Thomas Kuhn would describe as a normal science, with its logic of recruitment, identification, and professionalization: it would be installed in majesty and would have occupied most of the order of higher education and university. In the years 1960 and 1960 it would have found itself in the same situation as the professionalization scheme born from the end of the 19th century. The protest in the 1960s aims to challenge this « paradigm » methodological (Thomas Kuhn). For Gaston Bachelard, Paul Feyerabend and on another register Pierre Bourdieu the facts escape theory and therefore call into question the observations normative, correspondences, linear interpretations: there is not a single method but different ways of building knowledge and that it is necessary to propose alternative theories.
These different ways determine interpretative paradigms (Thomas Kuhn). She emphasizes different aspects : the first is based on the issue of institutional and professional consistency: indeed the scientific method is conceived as a normative, immutable and universal model with internal criteria of legitimacy (facts, correspondence, consistency, demonstration) and external (institutions, learned and professional societies). Indeed, the philosophy of science legitimizes the method of science as an autonomous, rational and axiologically neutral space called by Feyerabend « law and order» : it supposes an approach delimited between theory and experience, theoretical research and practical application.
For Paul Feyerabend there is no canonical history of science and any philosophy of science must advocate for a circular and non-linear approach that accepts non-correspondence between facts and theories The critical approach is part of the questioning of the philosophy of science : « Give me the standard you like, I will show that it is violated at certains stages importants in the history of science, not through forgetfulness or neglect, but consciously and deliberately « . (Feyerabend)
The internal standard of epistemology would not be sufficient, we must also change the criteria external: at the risk of calling into question the universality of criteria. Does it really exist different ways of building knowledge? This would mean that critical approaches in their plurality are legitimate and in particular the area of controversy which is at the heart of the construction of knowledge. The approaches of Feyerabend and Bachelard which upset the old methods scientists enable us to understand the multidisciplinary regime ?
To upset the methods, it would be a question of starting from space and criteria internal to science and common to all approaches (normative or non-normative) in order to validate or invalidate methods. Is that the case ? Doesn’t the criteria space as a referential framework induce a filtering cultural (Lazarsfeld) which exclusively determines normative methods because they are legitimate ?
Can we consider them as « open epistemologies » ? What would be closed epistemologies? Would that imply in a first delimitation a line demarcation between a non-normative and non-academic approach and a normative and academic ? Or is the stake in a second delimitation situated between two definitions normative of the philosophy of science ? Normality for Thomas Kuhn describes a state institution of science, should we not pose the subject of a normative philosophy of science ?
How is the philosophy of science inscribed in the study of science (physical, biological, mathematics) while forgetting the social sciences ?
We are in a system of systematic interlocking or the identity of periods and concepts relate more to the desire for distinction rather than to the reality of ruptures or mutations Philosophers of science have debated the evaluation of the relationship between theory and experience, epistemology and laboratory. Yet the distancing from common sense is she real or fictitious? Hasn’t it reinforced a neo-positivist ideology of scientificity ? Yes the method is abandoned what are the validation criteria to validate a plurality of method ? Because, as Bourdieu indicates, to be able to give up or enter a game, you have to be able to know the rules of the game. Have these changed because of having proposed theories alternatives ?
Bourdieu’s approach: From Bourdieu’s perspective, the cultural market conveys social structures, with an objective relationship between language and the group that speaks that language. The social values depend on the balance of power and the ability to impose criteria most favorable appreciation and determine the laws of price formation. From the time where a subordinate social group becomes truly autonomous and contributes to the construction of a hegemonic policy by creating a new type of knowledge regime, is concretely born the requirement to build a new intellectual and moral order, that is to say a new type of order knowledge and therefore the requirement to develop the most universal concepts, the weapons most refined and decisive ideologies.
The neo Weberian predicate constitutes the model par excellence of scientific socialization allowing to resolve politically within the institution, the divergent experiences of politics, class, religion, history.1 Social and cultural convention goes through the self-justification of a certain model of intellectual and political rationality, intended to allow researchers to respond to recurring problems related to society, career and culture, in order to to guarantee some form of civic link of legitimacy between the individual and society:
« We know that the ideological constructions that individuals or artistic groups or policies can produce to give their « choices » in the most diverse areas, political, aesthetic, ethical, the appearances of coherence, in fact present themselves as combinations of logically disparate elements that only hold together by force integrating provisions or common positions […] of constructions which do not have in them – same neither all their reason nor all their raison d’être, or which, like the philosophy of law, aesthetics or ethics, tend to give as grounded in the unity of reason what in fact rests on the unity of belief or, in a word, on the orthodoxy of a group2.
This logic of coherence determines a professional regime of the discipline which supposes a contingent link between the different types of knowledge delimited by the registers of the social division of labor scientific is a style of political language shared between actants, that is to say speakers of sociology: « Some are the tributaries of a certain form of public recognition so that others aspire to become ”3 Indeed, for the human sciences constituted in professional regime to construct a posteriori forms of responses that can resist the historical, political, social, methodological tests. Consequently, the updates the ordeal are of several kinds, between individual consciousness and collective processes, between stories social groups and political narratives, they lead to a continual reorganization of the institutional form is stratified according to social and cultural dispositions, personal and collective, historical and political representations, narrative conceptions.
These tests cannot be reduced to the logic of exclusion4, they cause a multiplicity of strategies or non-strategies that cannot be condensed into a diagram pre-established5.
Indeed anthropogenesis distinguishes knowledge as a professional and institutional order and knowledge as a theory and general definition of science. This can be compared to conception of the philosopher Ernest Cassirer as the need to think about the origin of knowledge in term of concept, in terms of theory of knowledge This conception of research is based a reflective approach to the epistemology of science in general and of the humanities and social in a unique way: by reflexivity we mean the capacity of a knowledge to think in terms of discourse, research practice and fields of intervention.
In the lineage of Ernest Cassirer Our purpose is to define three theses: The first thesis is to pose a critique of an integrative conception of the human sciences. incorporated into the history of science and technology. To do this it is to question the continuum of a professional and institutional history of human sciences.
The second thesis proposes that multidisciplinarity is determined around a philosophy of human sciences whose filiation is based among other things on a Kantian and neo-Kantian genealogy for which Ernest Cassirer seems to be an essential interlocutor.
The third thesis is multidisciplinarity as a science of culture. It aims to propose the project of multidisciplinarity as a project specific to the cultural sciences Wissenschaften: to the interaction between the sciences of the mind and the sciences of culture.
The first thesis is to pose a critique of an integrative conception of the human sciences incorporated in the history of science and technology. To do this it is to question the continuum of a professional and institutional history of human sciences : La science en as long as knowledge is organized as an autonomous space constituting the autonomy of man with regard to with regard to ideologies described as anti-scientific and specific to common opinion. What leads to the establishment of concepts marked by rationality (logos) as axiology and program (proairsis). These elements determine neutrality as the basis of the approach professional who aims to define rules of rational objectivity ( ataraxia ). Marked model through the professionalization of university jobs, institutionalization of research and definition of criteria of validation and legitimacy by the diploma. A discipline is the term that attaches knowledge to a space of study and to a field of practitioners with its internal rules, selection protocols, its interpretative paradigms. A paradigm as Thomas emphasizes Kuhn6 responds to a model of representation and operation obeying diagrams of behaviors and thoughts. Diagrams which have a limited lifespan because they have been replaced by new paradigms. Pluridisciplinarity therefore responds to a paradigm, i.e. to a context specific research history: which is a professional history of knowledge constituting the expansion of the university model at the end of the 19th century. This field of professionalization knowledge responds to an anthropology based on the model of Epictetus’ sovereignty or man is at the center of the epistemology of knowledge: man as the narrative master of his representations and its power of “self-emancipation” “The essence of philosophy is that a man should live in such a way that his happiness depends as little as possible on causes exterior 7″
The second thesis proposes that multidisciplinarity is determined around a philosophy of human sciences whose filiation is based among other things on a Kantian and neo-Kantian genealogy for which Ernest Cassirer seems to be an essential interlocutor.
The first link in our discussion is Emmanuel Kant and the work “Critique de la faculté de to judge ”Kant distinguishes there between the judgment of taste and the aesthetic judgment: the judgment of taste is a form of raw expression where it is for man to smell, taste, taste directly and gross to beauty. The judgment of taste is emotional in nature, it determines an appreciation taste, smell or visual of the world : This supposes a necessary interest which does not disqualify this judgment but circumscribes it to a stage in the hierarchy of Kantian aesthetics8. While aesthetic judgment is part of the order of feeling, i.e. a more internalized relationship than simple emotion towards the aesthetic object which is determined by an external drive.
In fact, through aesthetic judgment, we are in an interior and personal process which mobilizes our sensitive intuition and whose successive states in front of the aesthetic object connects us qualitatively to other men : « I first examined the moment of quality because it is that which the aesthetic judgment on the beautiful considers in the first place ” (note of § 1). However, that this is determined by the judgment of taste (emotion) or the aesthetic judgment (feeling) We rather we have here criteria on how to judge Beauty correlated with the notion of disinterestedness … Pleasure alone would make art one element among others of an empirical logic and sensualist: what Kant refuses, pleasure is a criterion in the appreciation of art in general and of its particular definition of Beauty. it rests on an ideal order of nature whose foundation is the critique of aesthetic language subjected to the observation of nature « Art cannot be said to be beautiful that when we are aware that it is art and that it nevertheless appears to us in as nature »The expression of aesthetic judgment being for the philosopher first of all order inner feeling: the expression seems to say the least intellectual, mental in the service of a rationality which brings the dialogue between gaze and work back into the psychological interiority of the subject thinking. In the definition given to us by Kant, aesthetic expression is a taste, a reasoning but not the active and immanent expression of the language that will constitute art. This one is, so to speak, formatted in an order of speech that describes a sequence of states of consciousness aesthetic (emotion, feeling, reason): with its modes of contemplation, perception and rationalization. Art is therefore a means of characterizing the freedom of man who by means first of all of emotion (judgment of taste) then of feeling (aesthetic judgment) and finally of nature (rational judgment) asserts its full autonomous sovereignty and conscience. Which implies that this same subject thinking on the basis of aesthetic categories defines the work and art that he first expériences emotionally then sentimentally and finally rationally. The aesthetics are of the order of pathetic (pathos, feeling) placed at the service of the judgment of the thinking subject. The point of view is that of the thinking and autonomous subject who aesthetically determines the criteria of the artistic work.
This determination aims to distinguish in the order of aesthetics in the first place « the judgment pure aesthetics ”which is the depositary of a definition of beauty : free beauty, that is to say rational and autonomous and the « aesthetic judgment » which rests on the adherent beauties that is say linked to reality and to functionality which plays a predominant role for example architecture
The Kantian thinking subject does not shift his focus from the work; on the contrary, the work is the final proof of his freedom and the manifestation of his autonomous thought: « The most beautiful music has no meaning for the non-musical ear is not an object, because my object can only be the manifestation one of the strengths of my being « 9. The thinking subject determines his action from the imperative categorical of an autonomous consciousness: I think for myself and of a common consciousness; which must respond to the law, to the particular action and to the responsibility. He expresses his evaluations, he must formalize the universal criterion of judgment: an a priori understanding which is structured with reflective consciousness and the universalization of principles. The policy of the universal proposed Immanuel Kant elevates technique in science, natural law (legitimate a priori) is superior to positive law linked to the fact (with the primacy of empirical legality with prescription and a contingent / historical foundation) by giving meaning legislator because morals require a prescription with a general character « laws practices « which cannot be » moral laws as long as they remain founded in experience ”17. In this configuration, physics underlies the fact of observing based on the empirical criteria including the organization of facts. This concerns material objects in collecting facts as sums of phenomena. Hence the need for a rise in generality, of a metaphysics allowing to use the a priori representation based on the unit of the observed diversity (size, space, nature, experience) that can be characterized by a politics of the universal. Kantian metaphysics proceeds from the passage of knowledge from sensitive to that of the supersensitive : a physical and speculative knowledge that is based on pure rules and principles as science by reason; “Since in the doctrine of duties man can and must be represented according to the property of his faculty of being free, which is entirely supra-sensitive, therefore according to his humanity, as a personality independent of physical determinations ”16. The exposition of duties must legitimize their applicability to diversity of experience.
A policy that is organized around the metaphysics of wanting to go beyond simple physics in order to found it a priori, is therefore an appropriation of a certain configuration (context) of modernity with a desire for a self-represented science in as a rationally legitimate foundation « of the very essence of the faculty of thinking and is by no means invented out of nothing ”18.
Foundations of Metaphysics, 53
Foundation of the metaphysics of mores, 1993, 50
New explanation of the first principles of metaphysical knowledge 1755, 14
Bourdi had Hei’s ont ol ogi e degg er Mi nui t 1988, 70 What does “think” mean ? It’s the ability of knowledge to understand its own epistemology.
In this case, epistemology affects not only the forms of objects of study but the narratives and the interpretation it undoubtedly calls for. As Rosa emphasized in her time Luxembourg, we do not spontaneously free ourselves from an order of things and an established model.
In a more epistemological way, it is a question of thinking about the presuppositions and the methods mobilized in the conceptual and theoretical apparatus of the discipline. In this regard, we find the Husserlian approach to refoundation » This alone will allow us to penetrate the deepest content of meaning which gives its unity in the historical-philosophical future of modernity: the unity that binds the generations of philosophers in what they « wanted » and which in itself orders all the subjective tendencies individual or school. It is, as I will try to show here, a prescription to a final form of transcendental philosophy as a phenomenology which includes in itself as a moment overcome the Final Form of psychology, which constitutes the eradication from the naturalistic sense of modern psychology. « 10
Husserl takes the example of the Galilean model of the « mathematization of nature » :
« Instead of real praxis (whether it is that which acts or that which is concerned with empirical possibilities, which deals with real or possible empirical bodies, in the sense of real possibility) we now have an ideal praxis, that of a « pure thought » which sticks exclusively to the realm of pure Limit forms. These thanks to a method idealization and construction historically developed for a long time and whose use involves intersubjective societization, have become an inheritance, an available habitus with which one can always again develop something new : it is a world infinite, and yet closed in itself, of ideal objectivity, which presents itself as a field of job. « 11 Founding a philosophy of the universal therefore consists in rethinking a science universal capable of constructing a representation of the world of « beings ». This project refoundation is for Husserl the only way to preserve universality but a universality which seems to accomplish the westernization of the world: » would be decided if European humanity carries within itself an absolute idea instead of being a simple anthropological type like China or India; and decided at the same time if the show of the Europeanization of all foreign humanities announces in itself the valor of a absolute, relating to the meaning of the World and not to a historical non-meaning of this same World. 12″
In line with a thought of decline (Spengler, Toynbee) Husserl thinks of the human sciences of in general and philosophy as a metapolitical project coming as a strong program of restoration of humanism European. From this neo-Kantian perspective, this science of the method that constitutes phenomenology is only one step in the process of reducing philosophy to science.
For him, the world must be thought of in a systematic and coherent way in order to place a universal knowledge system. Husserl envisions a philosophy that allows to apprehend on the one hand, the totality of being; on the other hand, the universal knowledge of real. « The task that philosophy imposes on itself, the goal of its life as philosophy, is a universal science of the world, a universal knowledge, valid in an ultimate way, the universum of truths in itself of the world, of the world in itself. « 15. Husserl, in his thematic phenomenological, returns to the essence of an ontological model which decouples in a way binary the outer world and the inner world of subjectivity. Therefore, the exploration of phenomena must be reduced to their essence : that is to say to their data subjective.
How is the universal constructed ? In its modern acceptance, it proceeds from the rationality as the rational authority of science with what it implies Definitional grammar : a metaphysics that links physical activity to principles universals of reason.We come back to the issue of the interpretative paradigms mobilized, actors listing and classifying the quantitative and qualitative elements specific to any legitimacy (human science, natural science, physical science). Multidisciplinarity is defined by combining several disciplines within the framework of a specific history of science.
This story that distinguishes knowledge within the framework of certification spaces (diploma, association professional, admission protocol) allow us to define an epistemology which, according to the philosopher Ernest Cassirer induces a comparative conception of knowledge: His treatment of mathematics, physics, and of chemistry, of historical and systematic disciplines is essentially of a comparative nature. Cassirer shows an unusual ability to blend the analysis of general characteristics of scientific methodology with the analysis of a specific branch of science. It is this ability to reveal the general mie in an example, without destroying the specific characteristics of a particular discipline at a given stage of development, which makes the comparative treatment of sorne branches of mathematics and of the natural sciences so illuminating for research in the social sciences. This comparative approach opens the way to a perception of similarities between different sciences and between apparently unrelated questions within thesame science « . Lewis, K. (1973), » Cassirer’s Philosophy of Science and the Social Sciences. » in AA Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, La Salle, Illinois, Library of Living Philosophers p. 276.
The third thesis aims to propose the multidisciplinary project as a project specific to cultural sciences Wissenschaften: to the interaction between the spiritual sciences and the sciences of the culture. In Cassirer’s mind and his philosophy of culture, the question of history is part of a theory of knowledge marked by a dynamic conception of culture.
These forms in Cassirer’s thought obey a linear pattern that begins with the analog system of myth (expression) continues with the presentation of forms and closes so to speak in the meaning of culture. symbolic forms have a territory of legislation and extension which of scientific knowledge extends to religion, arts and language, myth. It is a question of posing the problem of the anthropogenesis of narrations on professionalization humanities.
In the approach initiated in Germany in the 19th century, there is a double definition of History :
“History” is knowledge about history, discourse on history: it emanates from men and affirms the status and value of history13. The history “Geschichte” constitutes the set of events of the past, in the ontological sense: it is not reducible to a simple Evolution (Invention of writing, a new form of processuality). Is history a science ?
history is part of the human sciences, there will appear the cross between the subjectivity which tells the story in terms of narration and discourse and the objectivity that establishes the historical object of this subjectivity. In the Kantian construction there appears a separation between subjectivity and objectivity: with the primacy of subjective idealism, or even of a Bewufitseinsidealismus (« idealism of consciousness ”), which insist on an interpretive story that conceives the narrative produced under the purely autonomous and epistemological form, independent of the social context and cultural conditionings and regard consciousness (in the sense of a Cartesian cogito) as the starting point for all historical research. In a second dimension, History allows in a cultural study approach born at the end of the 19th century to transform the notion of culture into civilization, it is conceived as a value and no longer a simple culture : as Hegel says, the civilization becomes great through this desire to enter into universal history. 1 Lessons on philosophy of Hegel’s history (Vrin, transl. Gibelin, 1987.) As culture it is not determined not as particular or relative but as universal and absolute. Because it’s like relative
that she would shut herself off from others and die. To say that everyone has an equal right is to nullify any action, all life of the culture by which it criticizes, seeks to conquer areas which it were foreign, imposes styles in art, forms of government in politics, mores and social organizations. At this stage, what meaning is given to history? Is it a question of raising the issue of progressive scheme marked by the emergence of the notion of culture and which underlines the forms successive acquisition and construction where is a regressive type diagram or the notion of civilization is mobilized as a finality and stake of the society of men ? A civilization that describe how societies live and die ?
1 Saint-Evremond Charles de, Maxims and various works, Paris, Techener fils, 1865.
2 Bourdieu Pierre, Homo academicus, op. cit., p.91.
3 Interview with sociologists: Prof. Mohammed Aboubbou, Prof. Kais Marzouk El Ouariachi Brahim Labari 27 11 2014
4 Bourdieu Pierre, La distinction, Paris, Minuit, 1979.
5 De Certeau Michel, Giard Luce, Mayol Pierre, The invention of the everyday, volume 1 : Arts of to do, Paris, Gallimard, 1990.
6 Thomas Kuhn (trans. Laure Meyer), The structure of scientific revolutions [“The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ”], Paris, Flammarion, coll. “Champs / 791”, 2008 (1st ed. 1962), 284 p.
7 Epictete The Discourses, trans. WA Oldfather. 2 Loeb Classical Library Edition 2 vol. Cambridge, MA : HarvardUniversity Press, 1925 PP23.
8 Criticism of the faculty of judging 1790, Flammarion ; GF edition (September 2, 2015) PP 544
9 K Marx Manuscrits 1844, social science library@uqac.ca
10 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Paris, Gallimard, 1989, p 30-31
11 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Paris, Gallimard, 1989, p 30-31
12 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Paris, Gallimard, 1989, p298
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